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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
-r.1 • *.•« r,
* x.
Plaintiff-Respondent,

m

CASE NO.
141^0

-vs~
WILLIE FOLKES,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the crime of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (Heroin) with intent
to distribute for value, a violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8 (i) (ii) (as amended, 1973).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury on
November 12, 1974, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
of the Third Judicial District Court.

Appellant was

sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison
as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision
of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 1974, two
policemen (Officers Bell and Niemann) were stationed
on the roof of the Rio Grande Products Building for the
purpose of observing prostitution activity on West Second
South.

The officers were on the roof by permission of

the owners of the building (T. 33). While in the process
of observation, Officer Bell heard voices from a window
of the Baywood Hotel.
and "shooting up".

These voices were discussing heroin

At the same time the officer observed

a hand reach out underneath a window, holding a syringe.
A clear liquid was expelled from the syringe (T. 33).
The Baywood Hotel is adjacent to and connected with the
Rio Grande Building (T. 143,144,33).

After motioning to

his companion to join him, the officer approached the
window and observed the following activity.
Appellant came out of the bedroom of the tworoom apartment (T. 34) and into the kitchen with a small
amber bottle.

From it he produced two capsules which he

sold to a woman who was in the kitchen (T. 36,37).
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That

woman, with the help of another woman present, emptied
the contents of the capsules into a spoon and added
some water.

This mixture was heated and was drawn

into a syringe.

Finally each woman injected a portion

of the substance into the other's arm.

The women then

left (T. 37,38).
The police observed appellant return the small
amber bottle to the bedroom (T. 39). A short time later
appellant again went into the bedroom and brought out the
bottle.

He took one capsule from it and gave it to a

man in the kitchen (T. 39). This man then followed the
same procedure as the women had done (T. 39). The police
a second time observed appellant return the bottle to
the bedroom (T. 40). Officer Bell had seen the bottle
at all times, however Officer Niemann, because of his
vantage point had not.

Officer Bell motioned to his

campanion and mouthed the words that appellant was
taking the evidence into the bedroom.

Officer Niemann

responded by nodding his head up and down (T. 66,67).
The officers inadvertantly made a noise and
appellant got up to investigate.

Appellant went into

the bedroom where the bottle was and there he looked
out the window.

Officer Niemann aimed his gun at him
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and told him not to move (T. 40). The other man,
who was still in the kitchen made a move for the
door.

Officer Bell, however, stuck his revolver

through the kitchen screen and ordered the man to
remain still (T. 41). Officer Niemann then climbed in
the bedroom window and accompanied appellant into the
kitchen where he could keep his eye on both men.
When the situation was thus secured Officer Bell also
climbed in the bedroom window (T. 41). After the men the
were handcuffed Officer Niemann returned to the bedroom and retrieved the small amber bottle which Officer
Bell had observed appellant put there (T. 43).
POINT I
POLICE OFFICERS HAVE A RIGHT AND A DUTY TO
INVESTIGATE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY WHICH MAY INVOLVE
CRIMINAL ACTION.
Appellant contends that police may not spy
on people and that people must be protected from invasions
of their right to privacy in their homes.
admits as much.

Respondent

However, respondent submits, the above

has absolutely nothing to do with this case.

Appellant

cites Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and other
similar cases as authority for the position that eaves-
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dropping without a search warrant by peering in a window
is a violation of the right to privacy.

Respondent

submits however, that there are overridding considerations.

In the light

of all of the facts and cir-

,

cumstances, this is not a Katz case at all, rather it is
a Terry v. Ohio case.

(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

Terry stands for the proposition that a police officer
can and should investigate suspicious circumstances
in order to prevent or curtail criminal activity.
Terry v. Ohio, respondent submits, is controlling in this
case.
As this Court is aware, Terry involved a situation
where a police officer observed some young men walking
up and down a street in Cleveland, Ohio.

He felt that

the situation "didn't look right to me."

He further

watched the men who would walk up and down the street,
always looking in a certain store.

The officer then

approached the men, asked a question to which he received
no response, and conducted a search.

Finding a gun,

he then arrested the men (392 U.S. 5-7).
The men sought to have the gun supressed
because the search was allegedly an invasion of their
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right to privacy.
the search.

The Supreme Court, however, upheld

Their reasoning is as follows.

The Court

first specifically said that Terry was not a Katz type
case:
"We deal here with an entire rubric
of police conduct - necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the
beat - which historically has not been,and as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure."
(392 U.S. at 20).
The Court then went on to outline the test to be applied
to the officer's conduct.

The officer must be able to

point to specific and articuable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences of these facts, reasonably
warrant an intrusion. (392 U.S. at 21). In other words:
"Would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief1 that the action
taken was appropriate?" (3 92 U.S.
21-22).
Applying this law to the facts of the instant
case, it is obvious that Officer Bell's actions in
investigating a suspicious activity was both prudent and
constitutionally acceptable.

The officer was in a place

where he had a right to be (T. 33). A short distance away
was an open window of a hotel room.

From that window
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the officer overheard people talking about "shooting
up heroinM.

(T. 33). He also saw a hand extend out the

window holding a syringe.
from the syringe.

A clear liquid was emitted

This later act happened

twice (T. 33)*

Based on the above occurances the officer made
the decision to investigate further.

Respondent submits

that it would be inconceivable for a police officer with
four years of experience (T. 31) to shut his mind to
a circumstance so patently suspicious as that just
described.

As an officer of the peace he had a legal

duty to investigate.
It is helpful to compare the knowledge of the
officer in the Terry case to that of Officer Bell.

In

Terry the policeman merely saw some men walking up and
down a street looking suspiciously in a store window.
On the other hand Officer Bell heard individuals actually
discussing the commission of a crime, "shooting up heroin".
Further, he not only heard those words but at the same
time he saw a hand holding a syringe.

Officer Bell, armed

with a great deal of probable cause, had the full right
if not the moral duty to investigate.
Appellant characterizes this as a case where
his actions were:
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" . . . private conversations and
activities. . . within the confines
of his private residence [which]
were not exposed to the public and
were preserved as private."
Respondent submits that the facts do not justify such
a characterization.

If it was a private conversation

why was the window left open?

Further, the hand and the

syringe were extended out of the window and into the
"plain view" of an officer who had a right to be where
he was.
Appellant's entire authority can be distinguished
thus, on the basis that in none of his cited cases was
an officer drawn to ongoing suspicious activity which he
inadvertantly discovers.

In Katz, supra, and State v. Kent,

20 U.2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967), as well as the other cases
cited by appellant, a police officer, without a search
warrant, specifically set up an eavesdropping type of
surveiliince the main target of which was a certain individual.

The burden of those cases is that if an

officer had time to set up the eavesdrop, then he had time to
obtain a warrant, and that a warrant would not be issued
if it would be used to invade a place where a person had
reasonably expected privacy.
Katz and the others do not stand for the proposition
of appellant, that a police officer is not entitled to
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investigate suspicious activity simply because he sees
it or hears it from a private residence.

Appellant would

suggest that if a policeman heard a scream for help,
he could not climb up a fire escape and look through
a window to see what the trouble was.

This however,

is not the law.
In summary, when a policeman inadvertantly
sees and hears suspicious activity, he has the right,
under Terry v. Ohio, to investigate.
POINT II
THE SEIZURE OF THE HEROIN WAS LEGALLY ACCOMPLISHED.
In the instant case, police observed the following take place in a small two-room apartment (T. 34).
Appellant came out of the bedroom and into the kitchen
with a small amber bottle.

From it he produced two

capsules which he sold to a woman who was in the kitchen
(T. 36,37).

That woman, with the help of another woman

present, emptied the contents of the capsules into a
spoon and added some water.
then drawn into a syringe.

This mixture was heated and
Finally each woman injected

a portion of the substance into the others arm.
women then left (T. 37,38).
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The

The police observed appellant return the small
amber bottle to the bedroom (T. 39). A short time later
appellant again went into the bedroom and brought out
the bottle.

He took one capsule from it and gave it

to a man in the kitchen (T. 39). This man then followed
the same procedure as the women had done (T. 39). The
police again observed appellant return the bottle to
the bedroom (T. 40).
After the police inadvertantly made a noise
outside the window appellant got up to investigate.
Appellant went into the bedroom where the bottle was and
looked out the window (T. 40). Officer Niemann pointed
his revolver at appellant and told him to stand still
(T. 40). The other man, who was still in the kitchen
made a move toward the door.

Officer Bell, however,

stuck his revolver through the kitchen screen and ordered
the man to remain in the kitchen (T. 41). Officer
Niemann climbed in the bedroom window and accompanied
appellant into the kitchen where he could keep his eye
on both men.

When the situation was secured in this

way, Officer Bell also climbed through the bedroom window
(T. 41). After the men were searched and handcuffed one
officer returned to the bedroom to retrieve the small amber
bottle which they had observed appellant put there (T. 43) .
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Appellant argues that the actual arrest was
in the kitchen and therefore the seizure of the heroinfilled bottle was illegal as being outside appellant's
control.

Respondent submits, however, that if the

retrival of the bottle constituted a search at all then
it was lawful on either of two exceptions to the warrant
requirement:

search incident to arrest and plain view.

Respondent points out that the arrest occurred in the
bedroom placing the bottle easily within appellant's
control.

Also, since the seizure of the bottle did not

constitute a wide-ranging exploratory type search it
is legally permissible under the circumstances.
A.

There Was No Search In This Case •

The facts show that the officers personally
witnessed a crime.

One of them personally observed the

bottle from which the heroin was taken.
the appellant kept the bottle.

They saw where

Therefore, after the

arrest they simply picked up the bottle as evidence.
was no

search.

There

The officer knew what was in the bedroom

and merely picked it up as evidence.

It is absurd to

suggest that a search warrant was necessary in this case.
If the police officers had accosted appellant in the
kitchen and had seen him toss a bottle into the other
room, there is no doubt but that they could go and pick
it up.

They would not have to get a warrant merely because
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the evidence was in that manner placed out of appellantfs
reach.

It is the same in this case except that the bottle

was placed in the bedroom right before the arrest instead of right afterward.

Appellant would have this

Court illogically restrict the police from doing that
which is dictated by common sense.

Appellant's proposals

are directly contrary to the public interest.
B.

The Seizure Is Permissible Under The "Plain

View" Doctrine.
Respondent refers the Court to the third point in
this brief for a discussion of the "plain view" doctrine.
Suffice it to say, at this point that while observing .
the drug sale the police were in a place where they had
a right to bef the amber bottle was in plain view, the
discovery was inadvertant, and its incriminating nature
was immediately apparent.

Therefore, the officers had

a right to seize the bottle notwithstanding the fact
they lost visual contact with it for a moment.
C.

Even If There Was A Search, It Was Permissible

Under Chimel Standards.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),
the United States Supreme Court said that in connection
with a lawful arrest, police officers are justified in
searching the area surrounding the arrestee from which he
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might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence
(395 U.S. at 763). The Court also said that the extent
of the search must be "tied to and justified" by the
circumstances of the arrest (395 U.S. at 762). Respondent
submits that the "search" in this case, if it can be
called that, was justified by the circumstances of
the arrest.

Also the arrest occurred in the bedroom

and not in the kitchen.

Therefore, the seizure of the

bottle is permissible.
As indicated supra, Chimel holds that the
extent of a search incident to arrest is to be justified
by the circumstances of the case.
also adheres to this position.

The Utah Supreme Court

In State v. Farnsworth,

30 U.2d 439, 519 P.2d 244 (1974), this Court said:
"The question to be answered is
whether under the circumstances the
search or seizure is one which fair
minded persons, knowing the facts, and
giving due consideration to the rights
and interests of the public, as well
as to those of the suspect, would judge
to be an unreasonable or oppressive
intrusion against the latterfs rights."
(30 U.2d at 438-439) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, in determining whether a search is valid,
the trier of facts must give due consideration to the
circumstances of the case.

The fact finder must then

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a

PPly

a

balancing test with the rights and interests

of the public being weighed against those of a defendant.
In this case, it is submitted that the circumstances
overwhelmingly

suggested that a seizure of the bottle

was legal, if not logically mandated.

Further this

very brief and minor intrusion on appellant's rights
carries insignificant weight as opposed to the rights
and interests of the public. .
People v. Concepcion, 341 N.E. 2d 823 (New York
197 5) is very similar to the instant case.

There, two

undercover agents knew from personal observation that
a bartender kept narcotics in a refrigerator, and that
he sold drugs to patrons of his tavern.

The police

confronted the man, had him open the refrigerator, at
which time they seized its contents.

The New

York Courts of Appeals said:
"We conclude that the courts below
could properly have found that the
search and seizure were properly conducted; that 'there was not a wideranging, exploratory, rummaging, or
routine search of the character condemned in Chimel. . . . r " ( 341 N.E.
2d at 824) .
This logic applies to the present case.

In Chimel a

defendant was arrested and then police went through
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his whole house looking for incriminating materials.
Drawers were opened, closets, boxes, etc.
included everything.

The search

However, in the present case, as

in Concepcion, the officers knew right where to go to get
the evidence.

There was nothing but the slightest of

intrusions on appellant's rights.
Finally, appellant was arrested in the bedroom,
not in the kitchen, therefore the seizure of the bottle
is valid.

In People v. Hall, 226 N.W. 2d 562 (Michigan

1975), a man was ordered by a police officer to get out
of a car.

He did, whereupon the arrest was completed and

he was handcuffed.

Then the officers went back and seized

a packet in the car.

The Court held that the seizure

was okay since:
"We do not deem the slight change
in defendant's position with regard to
the packet as significant since the
packet was obviously within the zone
of defendant's immediate physical control
at the time the police began arresting
him, which is the crucial point of
reference for Chimel. (226 N.W.2d
at 563). (original emphasis).
Likewise, in the present case, the arrest started in the
bedroom.

That is where the

officer pointed his gun at

appellant and ordered him to freeze.

The arrest was not

placing of handcuffs on the appellant.

Rather, it occurred
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when he was restricted so that he knew he was not free
to leave.

Henry v. State, 494 P.2d 661 (Okla. Cxi,

1972), State v. Sullivan, 395 P.2d 745 (Wash. 1964),
State v. Vaughn, 471 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1970), State v.
Frazier, 537 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1975), Rodarte v. City of
Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976).

Therefore, since

the arrest was in the bedroom, the bottle could be seized.
This position was espoused in State v. Noles, 546 P.2d
814 (Ariz. 1976).

A man was arrested while lying on a

a motel room bed.

He was then handcuffed and placed on

the floor and surrounded by four police officers. An
officer than went over to a nightstand and found a gun
in the drawer.

The court sustained the validity of

the search since the nightstand had been "within the
immediate control of the defendant at the time of arrest."
(at 817-818).

Likewise, in the instant case, the officer

could go and get the bottle at the original location of
the arrest although the defendant had been handcuffed
and moved a few feet.

•

In summary, Respondent submits that under the
circumstances the seizure was valid.

A very brief and

slight intrusion on appellant's rights was more than
justified by the facts known by the officers.
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This slight

intrusion was heavily outweighed

by the rights of the

people of the State of Utah.' The decision of the lower
court, validating the seizure, should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE SEIZURE OF AND INTRUSION INTO THE BOTTLE
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court have said that contraband which is
in plain view may be seized by police.

State v. Sims,

30 U.2d 251, 516 P.2d 354 (1973), and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 402 U.S. 443 (1971).
must be met:

(1)

However, four conditions

the officer must be lawfully present

where the search and seizure takes place; (2) the discovery
must be "inadvertant"; (3) the seizable object must
be in plain view; and (4) its incriminating nature must
be immediately apparent.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

supra, and Ringle, Searches, Seizures, Arrests and
Confessions, Section 162 (1975 Supp. at 94).
Respondent submits that all of the above requirements were met and that the seizure of the bottle
was legally accomplished.
First, the officers were lawfully present when
they saw the amber bottle in plain view.

They were on
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the roof of the Rio Grande Products Building, by
permission, to watch for illegal prostitution activity
on Second South (T. 33). Second, the discovery was
inadvertant.

The Baywood Hotel physically adjoins

the Rio Grande Building and the Hotel has windows on the
adjoining side (T. 143-144, 33). As one officer was
walking on the roof of the Rio Grande Building he
heard voices talking about "shooting up" heroin.

Then

he observed a hand reach underneath a window holding
a syringe.

A clear liquid was squirted out of the

syringe (T. 33).
Third, the seizable object must be in plain
view.

After observing and hearing apparently illegal

activity the officer looked into the window and saw
the bottle in plain view (T. 36). Fourth, the
incriminating nature of the bottle was immediately
apparent.

Capsules were taken from the amber bottle,

opened and the contents was injected into the arms
of persons present (T. 37). Thus, all of the requirements
of the plain view doctrine are satisfied.

Therefore,

when the officers entered the apartment, they seized
the. small amber bottle from the place where they had
observed appellant put it.

-18-
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All the authority used by appellant does
not apply to this case for the simple reason that he
views the actions from a much too narrow scope.

If

extended, his argument is that if the police eye-contact
with an incriminating item is ever broken, plain view
is lost.

This is not the law.

In People v. Hauschel,

550 P.2d 876 (Colo. 1976), police officers viewed incriminating items in "plain view" but did not seize them.
Then, about 12 hours later that same day, the items were
seized.

The court sustained the seizure even though eye-

contact with the incriminating evidence was disrupted
for an extensive period.

In the instant case, the

incriminating evidence was viewed and a right to seize
it was established prior to the officers ever entering
the apartment.

The bottle was merely sitting on a

dresser in the bedroom and one officer there retrieved
it (T. 84).
Further, the bottle wasn't just an innocent
looking bottle as appellant alleges.

The officers had

personally observed people inject the contents of that
bottle into their arms (T. 37).
Finally, appellant claims that although one
officer knew all about the bottle, the second didnft
and it was this latter officer that seized the bottle.
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Appellant argues that since the knowing officer didn't
communicate his knowledge to the seizing officer, the
latter must have randomly seized the bottle.

Respondent,

however, directs the Court to the testimony of Officer
Bell"Q. [by Defense Council] Had you
made any comment prior to [the
arrest] to Mr. Niemann about the
amber bottle, or had he made any
comment to you about it?
A. Yes, I made the comment to him
about it.
Q.

Prior to entering the room?

A.

Oh yes.

Q.

What comment had you made to him?

A. Well, as we were motioning as he
brought the bottle into the room, I
just mouthed the words he was taking
it to the bedroom and pointed to the
bedroom like this (indicating), and
he nodded up and down. We didn't
converse too much out there on the
ledge between the two of us. (T. 66,67).
Respondent must admit that the other officer was less
than sure about whether or not he was told of the amber
bottle.

His testimony was that he simply could not

remember.
"Q. Prior to [seizing] the amber bottle
of pills, did you have any knowledge
of it whatsoever?
A. I don't recall if Don mentioned it
to me as we went in or not. I know I
didn't see it before entering, but I
really can't remember if he told me
that it was there or if I just visually
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
observed it and picked it up." (T. 96)•
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In other words, one officer remembered
the conversation and the other officer didn't.

The

evidence is a matter for the trier of facts and its
weight is to be determined by him.

State v. Mills,

530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975), Fritz v. State, 554 P.2d
819 (Colo. 1976).

On appeal the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

State

v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208 at 214, 357 P.2d 183 (1960),
State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 106 (1959).
In other words, unless there is a clear showing of lack
of evidence, the decision of the lower court must be
affirmed.

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).

Finally, even if the seizing officer (Niemann)
didn't fully comprehend what he had seized, it is
nothing more than harmless error since Officer Bell
probably would have retreived the bottle if his partner
had not already done so.
In summary, since the "plain view" exception to
the search requirement is satisfied, the seizure of the
amber bottle should be sustained.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the arguments presented
above, it is urged that this Court affirm appellant's
conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
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